HB's main findings are; Pass-through varies inversely with degree of market concentration and directly with the depositors' base. Secondly the pass-through to deposit rate is asymmetric for upward and downward revision in policy rate, with the pass-through for upward revision being lower. Concentration is measured by Herfindahl index and the markets are defined as metropolitan areas.
HB offers quite convincing explanation for the asymmetric pass-through from the Treasury bill rate to deposit rates. The crux of HB's argument is that existence of lags, between price changes and customers response to them is quite natural. If the deposit rates are increased today and the full desired response, in the shape of more deposits, of depositors is realised after a month, then for some period the banks pay additional interest to the depositors without mobilising more deposits. On the other hand suppose that deposit rates are decreased today, this makes return on deposits less than the required rate of return of some depositors. Such depositors are likely to withdraw their deposits. Suppose that the expected withdrawal is completed in a month after the change in interest rate, then for a while, some interest payments are saved. To sum up, HB argues that, increasing the interest rate on deposits is harmful for the banks in the immediate short run while decreasing the rate is beneficial. Given this deposit rate exhibit, upward interest rate rigidity. Mojon's (2000) analyses differences in financial structure across euro area countries and their implications for the interest rate channel of the monetary transmission mechanism. Main findings of the study are: The volatility of money market rates lowers the pass-through from money market rates to credit rates while inflation speeds up the pass-through to credit rates. Besides competition among banks also seem to quicken the pass-through. Mojon (2000) lists the various justifications for the common empirical finding of the rigidity of retail bank rates, discussed in the literature on interest rate passthrough. First, increase in bank credit rates makes the borrower pay more. The increase in lending rates puts greater burden on the borrowers purse, reduces his repayment ability and thus adversely affects his credit worthiness.
Second even small menu costs incurred while resetting retail rates could lead to price rigidities. Third, by not revising the rates despite change in money market rate, banks provide implicit interest rate insurance. This way, the banks invest in long run relationship with the customers. Fourth, retail bank rates being of longer maturity than money market rates lead to the problem of maturity mismatch. The higher pass-through for short-term rates and lower pass-through for long-term loans, like mortgages, tend to support this view. Finally, perhaps the volatility of the money market rates leads to uncertainty about the future path of these rates. If the banks were to adjust to the money market rates, every time these rates change, this would involve huge menu costs. This makes the banker delay the response to change in lending rate till he can work out the trend course of the money market rates. Bondt (2002) uses an error correction model to estimate the pass-through of changes in money market rate to deposits and lending rate for Euro area countries. Estimation results suggest that within one month, the pass-through is around 50 percent. The proportion of pass-through is higher in long run, especially for lending rate it is close to 100 percent.
An explanation, referred above, forwarded for the incomplete pass-through is that of maturity mismatches problem. The problem refers to the fact that money market rates are short term in nature while the deposit and lending rates could be long term. Bondt (2002) avoids the maturity mismatches problem by examining bank and money market interest rates that have comparable maturity.
In Pakistan with the introduction of the market based monetary management in 1991 the treasury bills have been increasingly used as an instrument of monetary policy. Greater the degree of pass-through and smaller the duration of pass-through, the more and quicker will be the impact changes in monetary policy on real output and price level. Given that the policy rate, that is the Treasury bill rate, in Pakistan has seen major swings, it is important to measure the degree and duration of passthrough to deposit and lending rates.
This paper aims at determining the duration of pass-through, of the Treasury bill rate (1) to call money market rate (2) to banks' deposit and (3) banks' Lending rate. The study is exclusively focused on Pakistan.
Remainder of the Paper proceeds as follows: Section II describes the empirical model and the data used. Section III explains the econometric methodology employed. Section IV reports and analyses the estimation results and Section V concludes.
II. EMPIRICAL MODEL AND THE DATA
To analyse the dynamic reduced-form relation between the Deposit rate and Treasury bill rate, following Vega and Rebucci (2003) , We specify the following simple auto-regressive distributed lag (ADL) model.
Where:
y i represents endogenous variables x stands for exogenous variable
We use Six-month Treasury bill rate as the exogenous variable. Four different variables are used one by one as endogenous variables. These are Call money rate (CMR), Saving Deposit rate (SDR), Six-Month Deposit Rate (SMDR) and Lending Rate (LR).
II.1. Data
Measurement of pass-through requires high frequency data. However, of the variables referred above monthly data is available only for TBR and CMR. Therefore to measure the pass-through from TBR to CMR we use monthly data. Deposit and Lending rates are available, only, at six-months interval. Therefore the pass-through from TBR to Savings Deposit rate, Six-months Deposit rate and Lending rate is measured using six monthly data. The deposit and lending rates used are weighted average as only these are available. The data span is 1991: 03-2004:12 . Motivation for the data span is that under the market based management of monetary policy Treasury Bills were for the first time auctioned in March 1991. Thus the data for Treasury Bills prior to 1991 is obviously not available. The data source is Statistical Bulletin published by State Bank of Pakistan. It's worth mentioning here that the weighted average takes into account volume of outstanding Deposit/Loans and the interest rate at which these Deposit/Loans were contracted. On the other hand the change in Treasury bill rate, if passed on to Deposit/Lending rate, would change the rate for deposit/loans contracted after the change in rate. In sum, as the weighted average rate includes deposit/loans contracted at previous rates besides the ones contracted at the new rate, therefore pass-through worked out using weighted average rate is likely to be lower than the one worked out using only fresh deposit/loans contracted at the new rate. As the rate applicable to fresh deposit mobilised and loans extended is not available before January 2004, therefore we use the weighted average rate. This limitation has to be kept in view while interpreting the results.
III. METHODOLOGY
2 To estimate our model we use transfer function approach developed by Box, et al. (1994) , which is explained below. Consider the following generalisation of the intervention model: 
It is important to note that transfer function analysis assumes that {z t }is an exogenous process that evolves independently of the{y t }sequence. Innovations in {y t } are assumed to have no affect on the {z t } sequence, so that 0
for all values of s and t. Since z t can be observed and is uncorrelated with the current innovation in {y t } the current and lagged values of z t are explanatory variables for y t . Let C(L) be: 
Where and are the standard deviations of y y σ z σ t and z t respectively. The standard deviation of each sequence is assumed to be time independent. Plotting each value of ρ yz (i) yields the cross-autocorrelation function (CACF) or cross-correlogram. In practice we must use the cross correlation calculated using sample data since we do not know the true covariance and the standard deviations. The key point is that sample cross-correlation provides the same type of information as the Auto Correlation Function(ACF) in an ARMA model.
It is, however, rare to work with a {z t } series that is a white-noise process. We, therefore, need to further generalise our discussion of transfer functions to consider the case in which the {z t } sequence is a stationary ARMA process. Let the model for the {z t } sequence be an ARMA process such that:
Where D(L) and E(L) are the polynomials in the lag operator L and t z ε is white-noise process.
Now estimate the ARMA process generating {z t } sequence. The residual from such a model, denoted by { t z ε } should be white noise. The idea is to estimate the innovations in the {z t } sequence even though the sequence itself is not a white noise process. At this point one may think about forming the crosscorrelation between the {y t } and 1 − ε t z . However this procedure would be inconsistent with the maintained hypothesis that the structure of the transfer function is given by (Equation 2).
In Equation ( 
As such, the filtered value of
Given that:
It can be seen that y t and C(L)z t will have the same correlogram as y ft and C(L)z t . Thus , when we form cross-correlations between y ft and ε zt-i , the crosscorrelations will be same as those from (Equation 2), as if {z t }was originally white-noise. Inspect these cross-correlations for spikes and the decay pattern. In summary the procedure for fitting a transfer function involves following steps:
Step 1:
• Fit an ARIMA model to the {z t } sequence in Equation (2).
• Calculate and store residuals { Step 2:
• Obtain the filtered {y t } sequence by applying the filter ) (
Step 3:
• Obtain the cross-correlation (and cross-correlogram) between t β and t α .
• 
• Examine pattern of the cross-correlogram (CACF). The spikes in the crosscorrelogram indicate nonsero values of . The decay pattern of cross-
(Best fit amongst the many suggested by the cross-correlogram), where denotes the error term that is not necessarily white-noise. Step 4:
Combine the results of (6) and (7) to estimate the full Equation (2) 
Step 5:
Check the properties of the model to ensure that it is well-estimated. For example quality of coefficients, parsimoniousness of the model, conformity of the error term to a white-noise process, and smallness of the forecast errors.
IV. RESULTS
The methodology developed in previous section requires that the data series be stationary. Thus any unit root that may be present need to be filtered out before transfer function model is applied. We h d augmented Dickey-Fuller test to check the stationarity of the data ls to reject the hypothesis of unit root for all the ransfer Function is to fit an ARIMA model to the {∆TBR} series. We obtain the Function (PACF) and the presented below in Table  1 (a and b)
ave use series. The test fai data series. Therefore we use first difference of all the series.
IV.1. Pass-through from Treasury Bill Rate (TBR) to Call Money Rate (CMR)
Using the methodology developed in Section III, the first step in fitting a T Autocorrelation Function (ACF), Partial Autocorrelation . These are respectively respective correlograms for ∆TBR and Figure 1 (a and b). As evident fr b), ACF as well as PACF up to 3rd la 3) for ∆TBR. We estimate different plausible models for ∆TBR and select the best among them using Box-Jenkins (1994) methodology. The model is:
om Table 1 (a and b) and Figure 1 (a and g are significant. This suggests ARMA (3,
Next, we filter (pre-whiten) the series, ∆TBR as:
The pre-whitened series obtained using Equations (8) is:
Then we obtain pre-whitened series for ∆CMR as:
Next we obtain cross-correlation and cross-correlogram between our prewhitened series: α t and β t . These are presented below respectively in Table 2 and Figure 2 . Table 2 ries α t and β t
Cross-correlation between Pre-whitened Se 
Estimation of (4.5) yields:
Then we obtain as: Table 2 and Figure 2 show that only ρ αβ (0) is statistically si d on cross-correlation between pre-whitened series α t and β t we select the model: 
ACF of
The ACF, PACF of the error term t e nd the respective correlograms are presented below respectively in Table 3 Table 3 (b) The best-fit fo is:
n Equation (12) 
The simultaneous estimation gives the same results. Then we expand the firs
The Equation (13) shows that the call money rate fully responds to changes in ore than 100 percent response of call money rate could be due to other factors and this seems to be corrected in the very next period. In Pakistan, banks are the major players in mo central bank can use the very fast pass-through to call money rate to influence the behav
IV.2. Pass-through from TBR to Savings Deposit Rate (SDR)
The ACF and PAFC of ∆TBR (six months average) an the corresponding Correlograms are presented in Table 4 The Figure 4 (a and b) show that ACF and PAFC up to 14th lag are significant. We estimate different plausible models and select the best among them using Box-Jenkins methodology (1994) . Next, we filter (pre-whiten) the series, ∆TBR by the best-fitted ARIMA model of ∆TBR. The model is:
The pre-whitened series for ∆TBR is obtained using Equation (4.8) is: 
Next we obtain the cross-correlation and cross-correlogram between our prewhitened series α le 5 and Figure 5 respectively. Table 5 Cross-correlation between Pre-whitened Ser 1 t and β 1t . These are presented below in Tab Table 5 igu sh hat ro rrelations een wh sis of the cross-correlations we t t a series α t and β 1t are significant up to 6th lag. On the ba estimate various plausible models and select the best among them. The model is:
Next we obtain the estimates of coefficients as given below: 
Then we obtain e 1t as: 
The ACF and PAFC of the error term and the corresponding Correlograms are pr 
ACF of
esented below in Table 6 (a and b) and Figure 6 (a and b) respectively: On the basis of ACF, PACF and the respective cross-correlograms of e 1t we estimate different models for e 1t and select e best-fit, using Box- 
We expand the first term in (22) using binomial expansion as under: 
SDR ∆ Equation (22) shows that 18 percent of the ch (SDR) during the period of change, that is, the h is not completed during the period of change Treasury Bill rate, using the language of relevant literature on pass-through, would say that SDR exhibits rigidity.
We filter (pre-whiten) ∆TBR and ∆SMDR series by the best-fitted ARIMA model of ∆TBR given in previous section. The pre-whitened series' obtained are: ange in Treasury Bill rate is passed on to Savings Deposit Rate first six months. As the pass-throug we IV.3. Pass-through from TBR to Six-months Deposit Rate (SMDR) 
Next we obtain cross-correlations between our pre-w cross-correlations and the corresponding cross-correl 7 a hitened series α t and β 2t . The ogram are presented below in Table nd Figure 7.   Table 7 Cross-correlation between Pre-whitened Series' α t and β 2t 
Estimation of Equ n examinatio of the able re 7 ws th the c s-corr lations b n, pre series t and t , are ignific nt up t th la Base on the cross rrela n, we tima plau le m els an selec e bes mong them. The best-fit for β is: 
Next we obtain as:
The ACF and PAFC of the error term and the corresponding correlograms are presented below in Table 8 (a and b) and Figure 8 (a and B) respectively. 
0.188 -0.178 0.129 -- Table   PACF of On the basis of ACF, PACF and the respective cross-correlograms of e 2t we estimate different models for e 1t and select the best-fit, using Box-Jenkins methodology. Then e 2t is estimated as ARMA process, where best fitted ARMA model for e 2t is: 
Equation (29) show deposit rate after a lag of 4-5 periods that is around two years. There is no passOne reason for the absence of pass-through, x-months deposits are of fixed maturity and the rate would change only when the previous contracts, mature. Besides as different depositors would have depo ne dates; their contracts would mature at different dates. Thus the full impact will not be felt til regarding asymmetric pass-through, could be valid here. HB suggests that, passthrough to deposit rates is slower for upward revisions as compared to downward revisions in policy rate because banks stand to loose, at least in the short-run, when deposit rates are revised upward. Out of the 166 observations that we have of the T.Bill rate, 86 represent increase, 73 decrease and 7 no change in the rate. The fact that more than half of the observations represent an increase in T.Bill rate, could be one reason for the slow pass-through noticed in case of Bank Deposit rates, assuming that the pass-through is asymmetric. However, to be sure that the pass-through is asymmetric, calls for further econometric investigation. through during the impact period. during the impact period, could be that si l all the contracts, contracted at the previous rate have matured. Second Hanan and Berger (1991) argument, based on empirical evidence,
IV.4. Pass-through from TBR to Lending Rate (LR)
We filter (pre-whiten) ∆TBR and ∆LR series' by the best-fitted ARIMA model of ∆TBR given in Section IV.2. The pre-whitened series obtained are: 
Next, we obtain the cross-correlation between our pre-whitened series α t and β 3t . The cross-correlation and the corresponding correlogram presented below in Table 9 and Figure 9 . Table 9 Cross-correlation between Pre-whitened α t and β 3t α t an p to 7th lag. Based on the cross-correlation, we estimate ifferent plausible models and select the best among them. The best-fit for β 3t is: 
The ACF and PAFC of the error term e 3t and the corresponding correlograms are presented below in Table 10 (a and b) and Figure 10 (a and b) respectively. 
Equation (36) shows that there is no pass-through in the impact period that is e first six months. The Lag structure evident from Equation (36) above, shows that lending rate respond e and a half to two years. The rather slow response of the lending rate to changes in Treasury Bill rate, should be viewed in the backdrop that the Lending rate examined is all inclusive, that is, includes the interest rate applicable to short term loans as well as long term loans, the pass-through to the rate for short term loans is expected to be relative quicker than reflected in Equation (36). Secondly, like deposit rates, the asymmetric passthrough argument could be valid here as well. Banks, at least in the short run, stand to loose when the lending rate declines. Therefore they are reluctant to change the rate consequent upon decrease in the Treasury Bill rate. Out of the 168 observations at we have 73 reflect decrease in the Treasury Bill rate. Assuming that asymmetric the slower pass-through to lending rate is due to th discussed in Section II.1 this tends to tone- s to changes in Treasury bill rate after on th pass-through is a fact, there are sufficient downward revisions in the Treasury Bill rate to slow-down the pass-through to lending rate. However to be sure on this count, further econometric investigation is called for. Third, applicable to fresh disbursements. As down the pass-through.
V. CONCLUSION
The influence of monetary policy upon real output and the inflation rate is well established. The influence is exercised through the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Perhaps the important element in the bank-lending channel of the transmission mechanism is the change in Bank deposit and Bank lending rates, in response to change in the policy rate (Treasury Bill rate in Pakistan). Given the above, this study has examined the pass-through of Treasury Bill rate to money market rate (Call Money rate), Banks' Deposit rate and Banks' Lending rate.
The broader conclusion is that pass-through from Treasury Bill rate to Call money rate is completed during the impact period, that is in the very first month. However pass-through from Treasury Bill rate to Deposit rates and the Lending rate takes much longer, that is, these rates exhibit rigidity. The results are in conformity with the empirical evidence in the relevant literature for other countries. In practice, the pass-through to the deposit and the lending rates is expected to be quicker than evidenced in this study. The reason is that the study uses weighted average deposit and lending rate. Given that the weighted average rate takes into account outstanding deposit/loans contracted at previous rates as well, (besides the fresh deposit/loans contracted at new rates) this tends to tone down the pass-through.
A possible reason for slow pass-through to the deposit/lending rates could be the asymmetry in pass-through rd revisions in Treasury Bill rate. W ecifically focused on this aspect is called for. Other reasons for the rigidit ank Interest Rate Pass-through: New Evidence at the Euro Ar nomic Perspectives 9:4, 3-10.
for upward and downwa hen the Treasury Bill rate is revised upward banks are reluctant to revise the deposit rates upward as this may adversely affect their profit, at least, in the shortrun. The same is true for lending rates when the Treasury Bill rate is revised downward. Out of 161 revisions in Treasury Bill rate, during the data span, upward revisions are 86 and remaining 73 are downward revisions. This might explain the slower pass-through noticed for the deposit and the lending rate. However to count on the asymmetry argument for explaining rigidity in pass-through, econometric investigation sp y of the deposit and lending rate could be menu costs involved in revising the rates and oliogopolistic structure of the banking industry. The exact answers demand further research.
